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Van Fraassen’s modal interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics is articulatedto support an anti-realist account of quan-
tum theory. However, given the particular form
of van Fraassen’s anti-realism (constructive empiri-
cism), two problems arise when we try to make it com-
patible with the modal interpretation: one difficulty
concerns the tension between the need for modal oper-
ators in the modal interpretation and van Fraassen’s
skepticism regarding real modality in nature; an-
other addresses the need for the truth predicate in
the modal interpretation and van Fraassen’s rejec-
tion of truth as the aim of science. After examining
these two problems, I suggest a formal framework in
which they can be accommodated–using da Costa and
French’s partial structures approach–and indicate a
variant of van Fraassen’s modal interpretation that
does not face these difficulties.
Quanta 2014; 3: 1–15.
1 Introduction
The quantum-logical approach to the foundations of non-
relativistic quantum mechanics has provided rich insights
into our understanding of quantum theory. (Here, I will
only consider non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Refer-
ence to quantum mechanics is restricted to this class of
theories and their interpretations.) The quantum-logical
approach has indicated mathematical structures that are
often used in the formulation of quantum mechanics (such
as orthomodular lattices), and clarified the relationship be-
tween these structures and logic [1–5]. Just as in classical
mechanics the algebra of states of a physical system is a
Boolean algebra, in quantum mechanics, the correspond-
ing algebra is a non-distributive, orthomodular lattice.
The corresponding logic–the consequence relation de-
fined for the theory’s language–is then not classical, but
quantum. (It is a delicate issue to determine the language
of quantum mechanics. According to certain authors,
there is no such thing. The language of the theory is only
a fragment of functional analysis [6, pp.83-85]. This is
part and parcel of the peculiarities of quantum mechanics.
For example, given that quantum particles lack identity
conditions (at least in one interpretation of the theory),
the language of quantum mechanics cannot be classical,
but it has to accommodate objects for which identity does
not meaningfully apply [7–11].)
The motivation for the shift in logic is the same under-
lying the construction of other interpretations of quantum
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mechanics, namely, to solve conceptual difficulties fac-
ing the theory; in particular, (1) to provide an account
of measurement, (2) to accommodate the well-known
paradoxes (such as EPR and Schro¨dinger’s), and (3) to
examine the issue of identity and non-individuality of
quantum particles. It has to be admitted that, from the
quantum-logical point of view, these issues have not been
as thoroughly examined as they could (most work concen-
trates on the issue of measurement), and that exaggerated
claims have been made on the basis of quantum logic
(for a critical appraisal, see [12, 13]). However, overall,
the approach still provides important insights, since it
suggests a unified picture to examine the foundations of
quantum mechanics.
Independently of the merits of the quantum-logical ap-
proach, it is important to distinguish quantum logic as
a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics from
quantum logic as a methodological tool to investigate
the theory. As an interpretation, Putnam [3] argued that
quantum logic provides an argument to support realism
in quantum mechanics. Roughly speaking, this is be-
cause in this approach all observables can be assumed to
have sharp values. (Putnam’s move towards realism is
correctly criticised in [14]; see also [12].) As a method-
ological tool, we can use the structures and techniques
provided by quantum logic as conceptual resources to
explore the quantum domain, without assuming the in-
terpretative moves typically made by quantum logicians.
Admittedly, the distinction is somewhat vague, since the
interpretative claims from quantum logic are based on
the use of (quantum) logical tools. However, as often
happens, the (logical) formalism does not single out one
unique (quantum-logical) interpretation, but underdeter-
mines several possible interpretations. Thus, using the
methodological tools of quantum logic, we are able to
provide alternative interpretations of quantum mechanics–
resisting, for instance, Putnam’s move towards realism.
In this paper, I want to explore one aspect of quantum
logic: its role in the formulation of the modal interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics. Instead of assuming the
interpretative claims of the quantum-logical approach,
I shall use it as a method to construct one kind of in-
terpretation. Although the modal interpretation is often
associated with realism in quantum mechanics [15], it
was first formulated by van Fraassen as an anti-realist
proposal [13, 16–18]. And it is in the anti-realist camp
that it belongs more comfortably. However, as we shall
see, given the particular form of van Fraassen’s construc-
tive empiricism [19, 20], two problems arise: one diffi-
culty concerns the tension between the need for modal
operators in the modal interpretation and van Fraassen’s
skepticism with regard to real modality in nature [20];
another addresses the need for the truth predicate in the
modal interpretation and van Fraassen’s rejection of truth
as the aim of science [19]. After examining these two
problems, I will suggest a formal framework in which
they can be accommodated–using da Costa and French’s
partial structures and quasi-truth [21–23]–and which pro-
vides a variant of van Fraassen’s modal interpretation.
Given the role played by structures in this new account, I
shall call it a modal-structural interpretation.
2 Quantum Logic, Empiricism and
the Modal Interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics
In order to develop a new formulation of empiricism,
van Fraassen articulated a proposal to overcome the ma-
jor shortcoming of previous empiricist accounts: to ac-
commodate the theoretical aspects of science within the
bounds of empiricism. The difficulty is that theoretical
talk cannot be eliminated from the scientific description
of the world without radically depriving science from its
actual content, nor can it be reduced to purely empiri-
cal factors. The early attempts, in the hands of logical
positivists, to reduce the theoretical content of science
to observation reports failed for well-known reasons (ul-
timately, science cannot be regimented in the restricted
framework assumed by positivism). The alternative sug-
gested by van Fraassen consists in broadening the limits
of empiricism, and rejecting the reductionism of former
approaches.
There are two central features of van Fraassen’s ap-
proach that I wish to emphasize. First, as is well known,
instead of trying to reduce the theoretical aspects of sci-
ence to empirical phenomena, van Fraassen’s strategy is
to change the aim of science, but still stressing the role of
observation to achieve this aim. According to his proposal
(constructive empiricism), the aim of science is not truth,
but something weaker: empirical adequacy [19, p.12].
Using the resources of the semantic approach (accord-
ing to which to present a theory is to specify a family
of structures, its models [19, p.64]), van Fraassen char-
acterizes this concept in the following way. A theory is
empirically adequate if it has a model such that its em-
pirical substructures are isomorphic to the structures that
represent empirical phenomena ( [19, p.64]; for a discus-
sion, see [24]). In this way, the empirical adequacy of a
theory reflects one role that empirical information plays
in science: to provide constraints for theory acceptance.
Now, empirical adequacy is strictly weaker than truth,
and it is reducible to truth only if we are dealing with
observable phenomena [19, p.72]. Thus, the search for
empirically adequate theories does not entail the com-
mitment to unobservable entities. For suppose that there
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are no unobservable entities in the world; a false theory,
which postulates the existence of these entities, can still
be empirically adequate. In this sense, by taking empiri-
cal adequacy as the aim of science, van Fraassen is able
to provide a proposal in which empirical factors have a
crucial role to play in science without collapsing into a
reduction of theory to observation.
The avoidance of reductionism allows van Fraassen
to put forward a crucial argument against realism: the
underdetermination argument. Because there is a gap
between certain theories (such as classical mechanics or
non-relativistic quantum mechanics and their interpreta-
tions) and empirical phenomena, empirically equivalent
but conceptually distinct theories may arise. And the em-
piricist sees no epistemic reason to select one of them;
after all, as far as the empirical phenomena are concerned,
they are equally adequate [19]. (Note that van Fraassen
only uses the argument from underdetermination in very
specific contexts, invoking particular theories to make his
case. The argument is never used as a feature of every
theory, applied to science as a whole [25, pp.346-347].)
A great deal can be said, and has been said, about this
argument, but for our present purposes it is enough to
indicate the role it plays in constructive empiricism. The
gap between theoretical models and models of the phe-
nomena allows the empiricist to remain agnostic about
the existence of unobservable entities, which are postu-
lated in some descriptions of the phenomena, but not in
other, also empirically adequate, descriptions.
This leads to the second empiricist feature of van
Fraassen’s approach that I wish to examine. Although
the constructive empiricist is only agnostic about the ex-
istence of unobservable entities (as van Fraassen points
out: “I wish merely to be agnostic about the existence
of the unobservable aspects of the world described by
science” [19, p.72]), he is entirely skeptical about the ex-
istence of real modality in nature, such as laws of nature
and objective chance. In van Fraassen’s own words:
To be an empiricist is to withhold belief in
anything that goes beyond the actual, observ-
able phenomena, and to recognize no objective
modality in nature. ( [19, pp.202-203]; the ital-
ics are mine; see also [20]. A formulation of
empiricism in terms of a stance rather than a
doctrine to be believed is developed in [26].)
To recognize real modality in nature is to recognize the
existence of non-actual, merely possible phenomena, and
also to recognize necessary connections in reality. These
are, of course, anathema to empiricism ever since Hume.
Thus van Fraassen rehearses here a characteristic point
of the empiricist tradition, although with a new twist.
Among the real modality the empiricist is critical of,
laws of nature are prominent, and with the emergence
of quantum mechanics, a new alternative could be pro-
vided. After all, given the crucial role played by sym-
metry in the construction of quantum mechanics, van
Fraassen has grounds to propose, roughly speaking, that
the concept of a law of nature could be replaced, in some
contexts, by the concept of symmetry [20]. Objective
modality, such as laws, are not only philosophically prob-
lematic [20, pp.16-128], but can also be replaced, in some
contexts, by a metaphysically less problematic alternative,
based on symmetry considerations [20, pp.216-289].
Now, because quantum mechanics provides a crucial
case for van Fraassen’s approach, and because of its over-
all importance in science, it is understandable that the
empiricist be expected to provide an interpretation of it.
In this context, van Fraassen formulates and develops the
modal interpretation of quantum mechanics. The inter-
pretation is presented as an implementation of central
features of van Fraassen’s general empiricist approach,
and I now discuss some of its distinctive traits. (In the
preface to [20], van Fraassen notes: “This book was
originally twice as long. When a general approach is
announced and advocated, it remains hand-waving except
to the extent that it is implemented. Accordingly, the
now missing part was devoted to a detailed study of the
structure and interpretation of quantum mechanics. It will
appear separately, as Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist
View [20, pp.vii-viii].)
The modal interpretation is explicitly articulated as an
alternative to von Neumann’s interpretation rule [1]. This
rule provides a close link between observables and states
of a physical system, indicating how to read assignments
of values to observables (essentially, value assignments
classify the states). The link is as follows:
Observable B has value b iff a measurement of
B is certain to have outcome b. (For a discus-
sion, see [13, pp.274-278].)
The crucial feature, as van Fraassen notes, is the logical
form of this interpretation rule: a biconditional linking
assignments of values to observables and outcomes of
measurements. The (apparent) classical flavor of this link
is noticeable. However, what happens if a measurement
is not certain to have a given outcome? To this question,
von Neumann provides a peculiar answer: in this case,
the observable has no value. The classical flavor of the
interpretation is therefore deceptive: not all observables
have a value after all–unmeasured observables have no
value, excluding the case of certainty [13, p.274].
The main feature of the modal interpretation is then
to distinguish between two concepts of state: value and
dynamic states. The distinction is motivated by the fact
that, in the case of quantum mechanics, (1) we cannot
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assume that observables have values, ‘there to be seen if
we look’, nor can we (2) assume that the evolution of the
physical system is determined completely by what those
values are. These assumptions may have been taken for
granted in the case of classical mechanics, but the picture
changes once we move to the quantum domain. To each of
these assumptions, there corresponds a particular concept
of state. The value state is fully specified by stating which
observables have values, and which they are; the dynamic
state is completely determined by stating how the system
will develop if acted upon in a particular way, and how it
will develop if isolated [13, p.275].
Corresponding to these two concepts of state, we have
two types of proposition: a value-attributing proposition,
denoted by 〈m, E〉, which states that observable m actu-
ally has a value in E (where E is, typically, a Borel set);
and a state-attributing proposition, denoted by [m, E],
according to which the state is such that a measurement
of m must have a value in E [13, p.275]. These proposi-
tions have a well-determined body of truth-makers: value-
attributing propositions are true (or false) depending on
value states, whereas the truth-values of state-attributions
depend on dynamic states.
If von Neumann’s interpretation rule is rejected,
the equivalence between value-attributing and state-
attributing propositions is denied. Only one side of the
biconditional holds. But what side? Since measurement
outcomes are relevant to what state the system is in, it
is natural that [m, E] implies 〈m, E〉; that is, if the state
is such that a measurement of m must have a value in E,
then m does have a value in E [13, p.276]. In other words,
in von Neumann’s interpretation rule only the right-to-left
conditional holds. This allows van Fraassen to introduce
unsharp values to observables. After all, if [m, E] is not
true (that is, if the state is not such that m must have a
value in E), it is still possible that m does have a value in
E, although this value may be unsharp [13, pp.276;282-
283]. Furthermore, crucial information about the physi-
cal system is provided by the dynamic state, which still
remains the basic state to consider, since it gives infor-
mation about the system’s evolution. In this sense, the
importance of the actual values of observables derives
from the fact that they provide indications about the dy-
namic state. And once we know that state, we are in a
position to know how the system will evolve (either in
isolation or in interaction with another system).
Far more can be said, of course, about the modal in-
terpretation; in particular, how it handles the measure-
ment problem [13, pp.283-299;317-337], the EPR para-
dox [13, pp.338-374], and the issues of identity and non-
individuality of quantum particles [13, pp.375-482]. But
instead of going into these issues here, I will consider
another pressing point: what are the empiricist features
in the modal interpretation? Two of them deserve no-
tice. The first derives from van Fraassen’s examination
of the empirical basis of quantum theory [13, §4-5]. As
he argues, there are possible phenomena in the domain of
quantum mechanics that cannot be accommodated by any
causal model (in a minimal sense of causality). (These are
common cause models, which spell out at least necessary
conditions for causality. A correlation between events A
and B has a common cause in factor C if: (1) C precedes
A and B; (2) P(A|C) > P(A|¬C) and P(B|C) > P(B|¬C);
and (3) P(A∧ B|C) = P(A|C)P(B|C), where P(X|Y) is the
conditional probability of X given Y [13, pp.53-57;81-
85]. If it is argued that common causes do not provide
even a necessary condition for causality, it can be replied
that the notion of causality under consideration is then
decidedly too weak [13, p.487, note 4].) Due to empirical
considerations, theories articulated in terms of common
cause models are shown to be inadequate, in the sense that
the structures describing the data of quantum phenomena
cannot be embedded into the theoretical models.
The second empiricist feature comes in with the in-
troduction of modality. As an interpretation of quantum
theory, the modal interpretation spells out how the world
could be if quantum mechanics were true [13, p.242]. It
explores possibilities in the way the theory pictures the
world (for instance, in what respect quantum theory is
indeterministic, in what respect it is not), extending the
account provided by the theory to unobservable factors, in
such a way that a fuller picture of the world is presented.
In this sense, the modal interpretation increases our un-
derstanding of quantum mechanics. Roughly speaking,
the empiricist component enters with the claim that, with
regard to unobservable entities (such as elementary parti-
cles), it is enough to say how they can be. (The epigraph
of [13] is precisely this statement of Descartes’s: “Que,
touchant les choses que nos sens n’aperc¸oivent point, il
suffit d’expliquer comment elles peuvent eˆtre” (Principles,
iv, 204; “That, concerning those things that our senses do
not perceive, it is enough to explain how they can be”).
This is, of course, a thoroughly empiricist point.) In this
way, a commitment to the existence of these entities is
not required, since the theory can be interpreted so that
what it states about the phenomena are only certain possi-
bilities (probabilities of measurement outcomes, relative
possibilities of trajectories of a given system etc.).
However, despite these empiricist features in van
Fraassen’s interpretation, I think the modal interpreta-
tion faces two problems if we try to make it compatible
with constructive empiricism. To these issues I should
turn now.
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3 Two Problems: Truth and
Modality
The first problem is concerned with the notion of truth,
and its role in the modal interpretation. The second con-
cerns modality: its status and the way it is introduced into
van Fraassen’s proposal. I argue that there is a tension be-
tween these two moves, and suggest a way out using the
partial structures framework. It goes without saying that
van Fraassen has provided a strong case for understanding
quantum mechanics in terms of certain modal operators,
and his search for an empiricist view of the theory in
a decidedly classical setting (with regard to logic and
probability) is significant. (As van Fraassen argues, quan-
tum theory itself does not require us to abandon either
classical logic or classical probability theory [13, pp.134-
135].) The point is not uncontentious, but as he points
out, quantum theory is compatible with the adoption of
a non-classical logic (such as quantum logic) as a frag-
ment of a broader logic that is classical.) None of this
is in question here. My point is to suggest an alternative
empiricist formulation of the modal interpretation, which
preserves as much as possible of van Fraassen’s posi-
tive program, without being subject to the philosophical
difficulties found in it.
3.1 Truth
Before spelling out these difficulties, note an important
feature of the distinction between state attributions and
value attributions of a physical system. First, state attri-
butions are theoretical constructs, and part of the worries
involved in theory construction arises from the proper
representation of these states. The point here is that, in
order to accommodate the claim that a given physical
system is in a certain state (state attribution), and to dis-
tinguish this statement from the system having a certain
value (value attribution), the notion of truth is introduced.
As we saw, the connection between a value state and a
value-attributing proposition is that value states are truth-
makers of value-attributing propositions [13, pp.275-276].
Similarly, dynamic states and state-attributing proposi-
tions are connected by the fact that the former are what
make the latter true.
In other words, the value-state distinction is cashed out
in terms of truth. As van Fraassen points out [13, pp.280-
281], if a physical system X has dynamic state (repre-
sented by a density operator) W at a time t, the state-
attributions [M, E] which are true are those such that
Tr(WIME ) = 1. (A few comments about the notation: (a)
Tr is a linear map, called trace, of operators into numbers,
which give us the probability that a measurement of m has
a value in E. (b) I is a projection operator, which is a Her-
mitian operator I such that II = I. (c) IME is then defined
as the Hermitian operator I such that Ix is x if Mx = ax
for some value a in E, and is the zero vector if Mx = bx
for some value b outside E, where E is a Borel set. (d)
That the trace function Tr provides a probability is due to
the following equations: Pmx (E) = (x · IME x) = Tr(IMx IME ),
where Pmx (E) is the probability that a measurement of m
has a value in E; (x · IME x) is the inner product of x and
IME x; and I
M
x is the projection on the subspace [x] spanned
by x. For details, see [13, pp.147-152;157-165;280-281].)
As opposed to state-attributions, value-attributions cannot
be deduced from the dynamic state. But, according to van
Fraassen, they are constrained in three ways, which again
are spelled out in terms of truth: (1) If [M, E] is true, so
is the value-attribution 〈M, E〉, that is, observable M has
value in E; (2) all true value-attributions could have prob-
ability 1 together; and (3) the set of true value-attributions
is maximal with respect to feature (2) [13, p.281]. So,
the assignment of truth-conditions to state-attributing and
value-attributing propositions is crucial to spell out the
difference between them (the former, but not the latter,
can be deduced from the dynamic state).
But how can we make sense, in empiricist terms, of
these truth-conditions? As we saw, for the constructive
empiricist, science does not aim at the truth, but at empir-
ical adequacy. In van Fraassen’s formulation, a theory T
is empirically adequate if there is a model of T such that
all the phenomena (properly structured) are isomorphic to
the empirical substructures of this model [19, p.64]. The
idea is that empirical adequacy, as defined, is reduced to
truth if we consider only observable phenomena [13, p.4].
Note, however, that in van Fraassen’s formulation, empir-
ical adequacy is a model-theoretic notion, and therefore
we are dealing here with the notion of truth in a struc-
ture. Thus, empirical adequacy can be reduced at best to
this notion of truth, and not to truth simpliciter. It may
be argued that we can define the latter in terms of the
former by stating that a sentence α is true simpliciter if
it is true in the structure @ of the actual world (suppos-
ing that there is one). The problem is that an empiricist
cannot accept this formulation without a severe qualifi-
cation, since presumably the structure @ incorporates
information about unobservables which the empiricist is
agnostic about. So the distinction between observable
and unobservable entities would have to be drawn with
regard to @, and we would be back to the properties of
the structure in question, and hence to the notion of truth
in a structure. I conclude that if empirical adequacy is
reducible to truth in van Fraassen’s account, the latter
cannot be truth simpliciter.
Now I raise this point because, as van Fraassen ac-
knowledges, state attributions are theoretical constructs,
and arguably involve reference to unobservables (in fact,
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a state is represented by a statistical operator, which is
typically a particular kind of Hermitian operator defined
on a Hilbert space). However, it is not clear how we
should understand, in empiricist terms, the claim that
state attributions are true. In order not to be committed
to the existence of unobservables involved in such attri-
butions, the empiricist would have to distinguish, in the
structure which describes a state attribution, an empirical
substructure from a theoretical superstructure. But it is
clear that this cannot be done, since state attributions,
as such, are entirely theoretical constructions, and they
do not seem to incorporate an empirical part. The point
here is that, in order not to be committed to the theoret-
ical content involved in state attributions, the empiricist
should avoid talking about their truth, and should run
the semantic analysis in terms of a weaker notion. My
suggestion, to be spelled out below, is to change here the
norm of theoretical talk to quasi-truth, rather than truth.
(Someone may argue that van Fraassen does not need a
substantial notion of truth to assign truth-values to state-
attributing and value-attributing propositions. He can
simply adopt a disquotational approach. The suggestion
is, of course, well motivated, given that, in some writings
of van Fraassen, the disquotational account plays some
role [27, 28]. But the suggestion faces a serious problem.
As we have just seen, in order for the notion of empirical
adequacy to be reducible to truth (when we only consider
observable phenomena), the empiricist cannot adopt the
notion of truth simpliciter. After all, as cashed out by van
Fraassen, empirical adequacy is a model-theoretic notion,
and so truth has to be understood in a model-theoretic
way. Given that a disquotational account is not model-
theoretic, it will not help the empiricist here. For what is
needed for an interpretation of state and value attributions
is the notion of truth in a structure. However, as argued
above, this notion is too strong for the empiricist to use
when talking about unobservable entities.)
3.2 Modality
Before discussing the concept of quasi-truth, let me con-
sider the second feature of the modal interpretation: the
introduction of modal operators. Since van Fraassen is
skeptical about the existence of objective modality, all
modal talk involved in his interpretation comes from lan-
guage, as it were. As he points out, modal talk is talk
about the structure of our own ways of representing the
phenomena [20, pp.68;92;213-214;223]. It is not taken
to correspond to something real, such as a possible world
in Lewis’s sense [29], nor is it taken to be primitive (else
van Fraassen’s position would lead to modalism). Indeed,
countenancing possible worlds would be incompatible
with a thoroughly empiricist outlook, given the increase
in the ontological commitments that they bring. And ad-
mitting a primitive notion of modality would be equally
problematic, since if this notion has any metaphysical
import, it will clash with van Fraassen’s skepticism about
modality (in particular, with the rejection of the notion of
objective chance).
It may be argued that constructive empiricism is com-
patible with Lewis’s modal realism [30]. After all, strictly
speaking, constructive empiricism is only a claim about
the aim of science–involving the search for empirically
adequate theories and restricting belief to the empirical
adequacy of the relevant scientific theories [19, p.12].
Modal realism is compatible with that aim for science,
just as a number of other metaphysical views are. Al-
though this is literally correct, the point of constructive
empiricism is to develop an empiricist account of sci-
ence, and a significant feature of the empiricist stance
is to be suspicious precisely of the kind of postulational
metaphysics advanced by the modal realist [26]. As a
result, it seems unmotivated and questionable for the con-
structive empiricist to embrace modal realism. A less
metaphysically loaded approach seems in order.
It is not surprising that modal operators are introduced
in van Fraassen’s interpretation of quantum mechanics as
algebraic devices; that is, constructions which mathemat-
ically have the form of modal operators in modal logic,
but which lack any other (metaphysical) warrant. Van
Fraassen introduces two kinds of modal operators, one
of them based on a transitive relative possibility relation
R (between possible situations), and another based on an
equivalence relation (namely, equality of dynamic states).
Let me briefly spell this out.
The modal interpretation, formulated by van Fraassen
in quantum-logical terms, has the notion of possible situ-
ation as basic [13, p.302]. A proposition is then identified
with a set of situations; intuitively, those situations in
which the proposition is true. We say that a proposition
q is true in a situation w exactly if w is in q [13, p.302].
Let V be the set of value-attributions, i.e. V = {〈m, E〉 :
m is an observable and E is a Borel set}, and P the set of
state-attributions: P = {[m, E] : m is an observable and
E is a Borel set}. Now, according to the modal interpre-
tation, a situation w is possible relative to a situation w′
(in symbols, wRw′) if for all q in V, if w is in q, then w′ is
in q [13, p.311]. In terms of this notion, modal operators
of necessity  and possibility ♦ are then defined for all
propositions [13, p.314]. Indeed, if q is a proposition and
w a possible situation, we say that
q = {w : for all w′, if wRw′, then w′ ∈ q} (1)
♦q = {w : for some w′, if wRw′, then w′ ∈ q} (2)
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This establishes at once a connection between state-
attributing and value-attributing propositions, namely:
[m, E] = 〈m, E〉 (a proof can be found in [13, p.316]).
The second kind of modal operator introduced is based
on an equivalence relation; namely, equality of a dy-
namic state x with respect to situations w and w′. In-
deed, if q is a proposition, we say that  q = {w : for
all w′, if x(w) = x(w′), then w′ ∈ q}. As a consequence,
a similar result also holds for this necessity operator:
[m, E] =  〈m, E〉 [13, pp.316-317].
From this brief exposition, it should be clear that all the
modal operators introduced in the modal interpretation
are only algebraic constructs, called modal because of
the formal similarities that they bear to the necessity and
possibility operators in modal logic. This may well be
all right given van Fraassen’s skepticism about modality.
After all, as noted, van Fraassen is not willing to be com-
mitted to the existence of a modal reality to which these
operators refer. But is this algebraic similarity enough to
characterize these operators as modal?
There is certainly a whole story to be told here, but
perhaps it suffices to note a few points. We are, of course,
allowed to call modal whatever operators satisfying cer-
tain formal conditions, and provided that we are only
concerned with particular formal results, there is certainly
no problem with this. But the issue arises as to how we
should interpret these operators, and what consequences
to draw about their status. Once we enter this debate, we
are doing metaphysics–not logic or the foundations of
physics. And at this level, as Lewis points out [29, pp.17-
20], we need more than purely formal considerations.
(According to Lewis: “Where we need possible worlds
[. . .] is in applying the results of [. . .] metalogical inves-
tigations. Metalogical results, by themselves, answer no
questions about the logic of modality. They give us con-
ditional answers only: if modal operators can be correctly
analysed in so-and-so way, then they obey so-and-so sys-
tem of modal logic. We must consider whether they may
indeed be so analysed; and then we are doing metaphysics,
not mathematics” [29, p.17]) Now, as noted, van Fraassen
surely has an account of modality to offer [20, 31]. What
is not yet clear is how the modal operators introduced in
his interpretation mesh with the idea that modality is a
feature of our language (of the structures used to repre-
sent the phenomena), and do not refer to independently
existing possible entities. For the necessity operator 
was defined in terms of (a property of a) dynamic state,
which is a theoretical construct and bears a clear relation
not to any linguistic entity, but to a physical event. In this
sense, we are apparently in a situation in which we are
reducing modality to certain physical circumstances (or,
at least, to events which depend on such circumstances).
And this seems at odds with the idea that necessity is a lin-
guistic feature. Moreover, the two other modal operators,
 and ♦, are explicitly defined in terms of a relation of
relative possibility among situations. But, as we saw, the
notion of possible situation is primitive, and it is not clear
how it relates either to physical or to linguistic events.
If it is argued that these situations function only as an
index set, and hence have no metaphysical import, we are
back to the initial position in which no interpretation of
the modal operators was offered. If these situations are
to have any explanatory role vis-a`-vis the status of the
modal operators, we need an account of them. A story
should be told about their status–otherwise, we will end
up with no properly modal notions. (It might be argued
that in order to introduce modal operators into the modal
interpretation, van Fraassen can use the idea that when we
accept a probabilistic theory (such as quantum mechan-
ics) we accept it as providing a panel of expert functions
to guide our personal probability, our opinion [20]. The
modal operators introduced can be interpreted in terms of
the expert functions: they guide our personal probability
as to the observable predictions of quantum theory. But
there are two problems with this suggestion. First, it does
not really allow us to interpret the modal operators, since
the latter apply to value-attributing and state-attributing
propositions, which describe unobservable properties of
a quantum system. The empiricist twist in introducing
expert functions is to restrict them to observable features
of the theory, but that is what the modal operators vi-
olate. Second, if empiricists adopt expert functions as
an account of modal operators, they will make quantum
mechanics entirely subjective. For quantum mechanics
would then be a theory about the change of our opinion
with regard to quantum states, rather than a theory about
quantum phenomena themselves.)
But why does van Fraassen need to introduce modal
operators in his interpretation of quantum mechanics?
There are several reasons for that. These operators allow
him to stress the empiricist status of his interpretation of
quantum mechanics, since they cash out the claim that at
most quantum theory tells us how the quantum world can
be. Of course, as van Fraassen notes, any interpretation
provides an account of how the world can be if the theory
is true [13]. What is special about the modal interpre-
tation, in van Fraassen’s formulation, is that this is the
most that the theory provides. The empiricist sentiment
expressed by Descartes in the epigraph of [13], which
was quoted above, underscores the empiricist nature of
van Fraassen’s interpretation.
Furthermore, it is via modal notions that van Fraassen
talks about observables having unsharp values. One could
cash out the talk of unsharp values of observables in
terms of partial functions. Van Fraassen acknowledges
this option but does not adopt it [13, p.307], articulating
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instead an account that leads more straightforwardly to
the introduction of probability in quantum mechanics.
Given that probability is a modality–a possibility with
degrees [19, §6]–it is ultimately for reasons having to do
with the introduction of modality that unsharp values are
cashed out the way they are.
3.3 Truth and Modality: Theoretical
Constraints
Can constructive empiricists make sense of applying truth
to unobservable entities, such as dynamic states? It may
be argued that they can as long as none of these claims
(that refer to unobservable objects) is ever asserted. What
this amounts to is that, although claims referring to unob-
servable entities are truth-apt, they are not to be evaluated
in terms of their truth or falsity: some other norm has to
be introduced. Which norm? Clearly empirical adequacy
will not do. As formulated by van Fraassen, empirical
adequacy is a property of a (class of) model(s), not a
property of a particular statement [19, p.64]. Now, even
if we consider the models of a proposition about dynamic
states, it is not obvious that we can determine an empir-
ical substructure corresponding to this model. As van
Fraassen notes, states can be identified in terms of ob-
servables, but not with observables [13]. So empirical
adequacy does not seem to be an adequate norm to eval-
uate interpretative claims about quantum mechanics, at
least from an empiricist point of view.
This raises the broader issue: how should one evalu-
ate interpretations of quantum mechanics (according to
the empiricist)? Clearly, the interpretations cannot be
taken to be true, even if they are truth-apt. For they refer
to unobservable entities, which empiricists are agnostic
about. Can empiricists claim that interpretations are true,
but they do not believe in them? Clearly, being a kind of
Moore’s paradox, this is not coherent. Can empiricists
claim that an interpretation, although not true, is still use-
ful (in providing us with understanding of the quantum
world)? Certainly; but an account has to be provided as
to how fictions (since interpretations are not true) can
increase our understanding. For example, how do literary
fictions increase our understanding? One needs a notion
of truth, or some modal notion, to cash this out. But this
is precisely the problem in the first place! Let us see why
either the notion of truth or some modal notion is required
here.
Let us consider an example. Suppose that you assert
that international aid can be problematic for an economy
rather than a source of help. Let us say that I am skeptical,
that I am unable to see how this can be true. To help
me understand this, you construct a little, simplified eco-
nomic model, in which the increase of foreign economic
help generate huge economic difficulties for the country
that receives help (for our purposes, we do not need to
go into the details of this model). It is then true in this
model that if we increase economic help, we deteriorate
the economy. If I then ask you whether this model is
actually true, you would then say that it is not, and that
it does not have to be in order for me to understand how
your claim about the downside of foreign help can be true.
I then point out that something more has to be assumed.
Your model does not have to be true, but it has to be
consistent with accepted features of the actual situation.
If there is no way in which an economy could possibly
satisfy the conditions imposed by your model, the latter
would simply be irrelevant to increase my understanding.
In other words, a crucial claim of consistency has to be
established before any assertion about understanding can
be made. And surely you would grant that if your model
were inconsistent with accepted information, it would
not be of much use to increase my understanding of how
your claim about the economy could be true. (Note that
even if you were a paraconsistent theorist–who acknowl-
edges that inconsistent theories need not be trivial, in the
sense that not everything follows from them–you would
still need to provide an account of why, despite its in-
consistency with accepted information, the model is still
coherent [32].)
What this indicates is the need for a modal notion–
consistency–in the characterization of understanding. Can
empiricists help themselves to such a notion? As usually
formulated, consistency is identified with the existence
of an abstract structure (the model of the relevant theory
or sentence). But given that an abstract structure is not
observable, it is not something an empiricist can believe
in. Alternatively, consistency is understood in terms of
possibility, as a claim that the relevant theory or sentence
is possible, that it can be true. But this means that the
empiricist has to assume a primitive notion of modality.
It is unclear, however, how to reconcile such primitive no-
tion of modality with the skepticism about modal notions
found in constructive empiricism.
It may be argued that constructive empiricists do not
have to be skeptical about logical consistency, since this
notion is well understood on its own. I think this response
makes very good sense. In fact, it is one that I will rec-
ommend below. There are, of course, several arguments
to the effect that a proper characterization of modal no-
tions requires the introduction of possible worlds or other
entities, such as abstract objects, which are not part of
the empiricist’s ontology [29]. Constructive empiricists
should resist these arguments, and offer a modalist ac-
count of logical concepts, which recognizes the need for,
and the intelligibility of, a primitive logical notion of
consistency [33–36].
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Thus, the example about the economic model illus-
trates that an account of understanding requires talk of
consistency. But it also illustrates where truth steps in.
As noted above, it is important that in the economic model
your claim about foreign help is true. You will probably
say that this is only the notion of truth in a model; what
does that have to do with truth?
This is, of course, an important question, and here
there seems to be a tension in the use of these two no-
tions in constructive empiricism. In some contexts, per-
haps dialectical ones involving debates with the scien-
tific realist, truth is taken as a perfect correspondence
between all components of a model of a theory and the
world [19, 20]; in other contexts, truth is taken in a mini-
malist sense [27,28]. Truth in a structure becomes crucial
in contexts in which one wishes to claim that empiri-
cal adequacy is truth about the observable domain. For
empirical adequacy is a model-theoretic notion in van
Fraassen’s hands [19, p.64], and for it to be identified
with truth about observables, truth has to be thought of
in model-theoretic terms as well. After all, if truth is not
conceived in this way, it cannot be a property of a model,
as is the case with empirical adequacy. Truth simpliciter
is not a norm of science for the constructive empiricist;
but this is the notion of truth adopted by scientific realists,
and van Fraassen uses it when discussing with them, in
order to avoid begging the question against them. The
use of a minimalist notion of truth has emerged later in
constructive empiricism. The notion is employed when
we are talking about our language in use, in contrast with
a language that requires interpretation; in the latter case,
the notion of truth in an interpretation is adopted [28].
But since the minimalist notion of truth is ontologically
committing, this is not a notion that the empiricist can
adopt without worry. (Given the following instantiation
of the disquotational schema: “‘There are electrons’ is
true iff there are electrons”, the empiricist cannot claim
that the sentence ‘There are electrons’ is true without be-
ing ontologically committed to the existence of electrons.
That is why van Fraassen introduces a norm different from
truth in the interpretation of science, namely, empirical
adequacy.)
Suppose then that these different uses of truth are kept
apart and are only explored in appropriate contexts. What
is the problem? The problem is that in the context of the
modal interpretation, both truth and truth in a structure
are used. On the one hand, since the talk of dynamic and
value states is not part of our language in use, in the sense
that it is not part of our daily vocabulary, it requires an
interpretation; and the truth-conditions given to state and
value attributions are expressed in terms of a model (the
one characterizing the modal interpretation). However,
van Fraassen also talks about the truth of quantum me-
chanics plus the modal interpretation. On his view, it is in
this global setting that we should consider how the world
can be if quantum mechanics is true. But in this setting,
he is talking about truth simpliciter, for he is considering
the world rather than a model of it. We no longer have
truth in a structure.
It might be argued that these are two different contexts:
one spells out the truth-conditions for state and value at-
tributions (and the empiricist uses truth in a structure);
the other determines the truth-conditions of quantum me-
chanics and the modal interpretation as a whole (and the
empiricist uses truth simpliciter). But it is not at all ob-
vious that we have different contexts here. The modal
interpretation is, of course, parasitic on quantum me-
chanics: it is an interpretation of that theory after all. If
we were to assert its truth, we would have to assert the
truth of quantum mechanics as well. (What I mean here
is that, as an interpretation of quantum mechanics, and
not as a rival theory, the modal interpretation has to be
consistent with quantum theory.) In other words, in the
same context–the one determined by quantum mechanics–
the empiricist uses two different notions of truth, and of
course the two notions are not equivalent. The problem
with this is that truth in a structure is compatible with
falsity of the notions under consideration, whereas truth
simpliciter is not. (Throughout this discussion I assume
with the empiricist that the underlying logic is classical.)
So even if the truth-conditions for state-attributions are
satisfied, the resulting propositions may actually be false.
For the truth-conditions were specified in terms of truth
in a structure. For example, suppose that it is true in a
model that all frogs are purple provided that they live in
a forest. Now, even if it is in fact true that frogs live in
forests, it does not follow that frogs are purple. From a
semantic viewpoint, this indicates the limitation of the
proposed account.
What if the notion of truth in a structure is abandoned,
and only truth simpliciter is used to characterize the truth-
conditions of state attributions? If this is done, no longer
will the empiricist be able to claim that the truth of state
attributions is not ontologically problematic, since it was
only established with respect to a model. (After all, the
truth of a state attribution in a given model does not
establish its truth.) As a result, the introduction of truth-
conditions for state attributions becomes ontologically
problematic for the empiricist.
But perhaps the empiricist would adopt a different ap-
proach. The idea is not to introduce truth in a structure
as a way of alleviating ontological commitments to un-
observable objects. Truth-conditions are not formulated
in terms of a model, but they are expressed as truth sim-
pliciter. The avoidance of ontological commitment arises
from the fact that the truth of state attributions is never
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asserted. Rather the empiricist considers quantum me-
chanics and the modal interpretation as a whole package
(that is, quantum mechanics plus the interpretative addi-
tions provided by the modal interpretation). In this case,
the empiricist will not assert the truth of the resulting the-
ory and interpretation–only the empirical adequacy of the
compound matters. And given that empirical adequacy is
weaker than truth, and does not depend on the existence
of any unobservable entity, it brings no problem for the
empiricist.
What this proposal amounts to is the denial that in-
terpretations of quantum mechanics could be evaluated
independently of the theory itself. In other words, we
should consider quantum mechanics together with each
of its interpretations, and evaluate the whole package in
terms of its empirical adequacy. Since every interpre-
tation is empirically superfluous (otherwise we would
generate a rival theory), the empirical adequacy of any
interpretation plus quantum mechanics is guaranteed, pro-
vided that the latter is empirically adequate. As a result,
as noted above, empirical adequacy is not an informative
criterion for the evaluation of interpretations of quantum
mechanics. It is not an adequate norm for the interpre-
tation of theories, since every interpretation, in virtue of
being an interpretation rather than a rival theory, satisfies
it.
After carefully, distinguishing the theory from its in-
terpretations, the empiricist now seems to insist that we
should evaluate both as a package. If we are to avoid on-
tological commitment to unobservable entities, we should
only assert the empirical adequacy of the resulting com-
pound. But why should one resist the temptation of as-
serting the truth of the latter? Except for avoiding the
inflationary metaphysics associated with the interpreta-
tion, there seems to be no reason why one should not
make that move. This means that only empiricists would
be persuaded by this suggestion. Is there any reason
that constructive empiricists can offer to those who do
not share their view, why they should avoid making any
claim beyond the empirical adequacy of the compound
theory plus interpretation?
Note also that by considering quantum mechanics plus
its interpretation as a package only, the constructive em-
piricist is in no position to assess the truth of such in-
terpretations independently of the theory. This makes
it difficult to evaluate critically rival interpretations of
quantum mechanics, since any such assessment presup-
poses that one can demarcate the interpretation from the
formalism of the theory, which clearly can be done.
We have now reached the point where the two
themes of this section–truth and modality in the modal
interpretation–meet. As we saw, truth was introduced
in the modal interpretation to separate state-attributing
propositions from value-attributing ones. But, given the
empiricist constraints of van Fraassen’s view, truth de-
termines a norm that is too strong to be applicable to
state-attributions. Modality has also been introduced, but
here the account seems to be too weak to provide the
required philosophical warrant for them. The question
arises naturally: Is there an empiricist account that pro-
vides both a weaker notion of truth and a stronger account
of modality? If so, is this account also appropriate to the
particularities of the quantum domain? In order to answer
these questions, da Costa and French’s partial structures
approach provides a useful tool.
4 Partial Structures and
Quasi-Truth
The partial structures approach (as first presented in
[37, 38], and then extended in [21–23]) relies on three
main notions: partial relation, partial structure, and quasi-
truth. (Further developments and applications of this ap-
proach can also be found in [24,39–45].) One of the main
motivations for introducing this proposal comes from
the need for supplying a formal framework in which the
openness and incompleteness of information dealt with
in scientific practice can be accommodated in a unified
way [23]. Two proposals are central to this task. First, the
usual concept of structure is extended to model the par-
tialness of information we have about a certain domain,
thus leading to the concept of a partial structure. Second,
the Tarskian characterization of the concept of truth for
such partial contexts is advanced, and the corresponding
concept of quasi-truth is formulated.
To characterize a partial structure, one need, first, to
formulate an appropriate notion of partial relation. When
investigating a certain domain of knowledge ∆ (which is
a field of the empirical sciences, such as particle physics),
we formulate a conceptual framework that helps us sys-
tematize and organize the information we obtain about
∆. This domain is tentatively represented by a set D of
objects, and is studied by the examination of the relations
holding among D’s elements. However, given a certain
relation R defined over D, we often do not know whether
all the objects of D (or n-tuples thereof) are related by
R. This is part and parcel of the incompleteness of our
information about ∆, and is formally accommodated by
the concept of partial relation. More formally, let D be
a non-empty set; an n-place partial relation R over D is
a triple 〈R1,R2,R3〉, where R1, R2, and R3 are mutually
disjoint sets, with R1 ∪ R2 ∪ R3 = Dn, and such that: R1
is the set of n-tuples that (we know that) belong to R, R2
is the set of n-tuples that (we know that) do not belong to
R, and R3 is the set of n-tuples for which we do not know
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whether they belong or not to R. (Note that if R3 is empty,
R is a usual n-place relation that can be identified with
R1.)
In order to represent the information about the domain
under consideration, we need a notion of structure. The
following characterization, formulated in terms of partial
relations and based on the standard concept of structure, is
meant to provide a notion that is broad enough to accom-
modate the partiality usually found in scientific practice.
Partial relations do the main work, of course. A partial
structure S is an ordered pair 〈D,Ri〉i∈I , where D is a
non-empty set and (Ri)i∈I is a family of partial relations
defined over D. (The partiality at stake here is due to the
incompleteness of our knowledge about the domain un-
der investigation. Given additional information, a partial
relation may become total. Hence, the partiality modeled
by the partial structures approach is not understood as an
ontological partiality in the world–an aspect about which
an empiricist will be glad to remain agnostic. In other
words, what is at issue is an epistemic, not an ontological
partiality.)
In order to systematize our knowledge of ∆ (say, again,
particle physics), the domain D of the partial structure S
is typically constituted by two components: (1) observ-
able objects (in the physics of particles, configurations
in a Wilson chamber, spectral lines etc.), whose set is
denoted by D1; and (2) unobservable objects (quarks, for
example), whose set is denoted by D2. It is understood
that D1 ∩ D2 = ∅, and we require that D = D1 ∪ D2. In
this way, the modeling of ∆ involves new partial relations
R j, j ∈ J (defined over D2), some of which may help
to extend the relations Ri, i ∈ I (defined over D1). As
a result, if we want to be explicit, a partial structure S
has the following form: 〈D1,D2,Ri,R j〉i∈I, j∈J . But it is
usually easier to refer to it simply as 〈D,Rk〉k∈K [22, 43].
Two of the three basic notions of the partial structures
approach are now defined. To formulate the last, and
crucial one–quasi-truth–an auxiliary notion is required.
The idea is to use, in the characterization of quasi-truth,
the resources offered by Tarski’s definition of truth. But
since it is only defined for full structures, we have to
introduce an intermediary notion of structure to connect
full to partial structures. This is the first role of those
structures that extend a partial structure A into a full, total
structure (which are called A-normal structures). Their
second role is purely model-theoretic, namely to put for-
ward an interpretation of a given language and, in terms
of it, to characterize basic semantic notions. The question
then is: how should A-normal structures be defined? Here
is an answer. Let A = 〈D,Ri〉i∈I be a partial structure.
We say that the structure B = 〈D′,R′i〉i∈I is an A-normal
structure if (1) D = D′, (2) every constant of the language
in question is interpreted by the same object both in A
and in B, and (3) R′i extends the corresponding relation Ri
(in the sense that each R′i , supposed of arity n, is defined
for all n-tuples of elements of D′). Although each R′i is
defined for all n-tuples over D′, it holds for some of them
(the R′i1-component of R
′
i), and it does not hold for others
(the R′i2-component).
As a result, given a partial structure A, there are several
A-normal structures. Suppose that, for a given n-place
partial relation Ri, we do not know whether Ria1 . . . an
holds or not. One way of extending Ri into a full R′i re-
lation is to look for information to establish that it does
hold, another way is to look for the contrary information.
Both are prima facie possible ways of extending the par-
tiality of Ri. But the same indeterminacy may be found
with other objects of the domain, distinct from a1, . . . , an
(for instance, does Rib1 . . . bn hold?), and with other rela-
tions distinct from Ri (for example, is R jb1 . . . bn the case,
with j , i?). In this sense, there are too many possible
extensions of the partial relations that constitute A. Thus,
we need to provide constraints to restrict the acceptable
extensions of A.
In order to do that, we need first to formulate a further
auxiliary notion [37]. A pragmatic structure is a partial
structure to which a third component has been added: a
set of accepted sentences P, which represents the accepted
information about the structure’s domain. (Depending
on the interpretation of science that is adopted, differ-
ent kinds of sentences are to be introduced in P: realists
will typically include laws and theories, whereas empiri-
cists will add mainly certain empirical regularities and
observational statements about the domain in question.)
A pragmatic structure is then a triple A = 〈D,Ri, P〉i∈I ,
where D is a non-empty set, (Ri)i∈I is a family of partial
relations defined over D, and P is a set of accepted sen-
tences. The idea is that P introduces constraints on the
ways that a partial structure can be extended.
The conditions for the existence of A-normal structures
can now be spelled out [37]. Let A = 〈D,Ri, P〉i∈I , be
a pragmatic structure. For each partial relation Ri, we
construct a set Mi of atomic sentences and negations of
atomic sentences, such that the former correspond to the
n-tuples that satisfy Ri, and the latter to those n-tuples
that do not satisfy Ri. Let M be
⋃
i∈I Mi. Therefore, a
pragmatic structure A admits an A-normal structure iff
the set M ∪ P is consistent. (Consistency here is taken as
a primitive, logical notion; see [35, 36].)
Assuming that such conditions are met, we can now
formulate the concept of quasi-truth. A sentence α is
quasi-true in A according to B if (1) A = 〈D,Ri, P〉i∈I is
a pragmatic structure, (2) B = 〈D′,R′i〉i∈I is an A-normal
structure, and (3) α is true in B (in the Tarskian sense). If
α is not quasi-true in A according to B, we say that α is
quasi-false (in A according to B). Moreover, we say that
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a sentence α is quasi-true if there is a pragmatic structure
A and a corresponding A-normal structure B such that α
is true in B (according to Tarski’s account). Otherwise, α
is quasi-false.
The idea, intuitively speaking, is that a quasi-true sen-
tence α does not describe the whole domain to which it
refers, but only an aspect of it–the one modeled by the
relevant partial structure A. After all, there are several dif-
ferent ways in which A can be extended to a full structure,
and in some of these extensions α may not be true. As
a result, the notion of quasi-truth is strictly weaker than
truth: although every true sentence is (trivially) quasi-true,
a quasi-true sentence is not necessarily true (since it may
be false in certain extensions of A).
To illustrate the use of this notion, let us consider an
example. As is well known, Newtonian mechanics is
appropriate to explain the behavior of bodies under cer-
tain conditions, such as bodies that, roughly speaking,
have low velocity in comparison with that of light, are not
subject to strong gravitational fields etc. With the formula-
tion of special relativity, we know that if these conditions
are not satisfied, Newtonian mechanics is false. In this
sense, these conditions specify a family of partial rela-
tions, which delimit the context in which the theory holds.
Although Newtonian mechanics is not true (and we know
under what conditions it is false), it is quasi-true; that is,
it is true in a given context, determined by a pragmatic
structure and a corresponding A-normal one [39].
Having discussed the formulation of partial structures
and quasi-truth, we can now consider an application of
this conceptual framework to the modal interpretation of
quantum mechanics.
5 Modality, Quasi-Truth and the
Modal-Structural Interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics
My suggestion here is that the framework sketched above
in terms of partial structures and quasi-truth provides at
least a partial answer to the two questions raised at the
end of section 3, namely: Is there an empiricist account
that provides both a weaker notion of truth and a stronger
account of modality? And is this account also appropriate
to the particularities of the quantum domain? The idea is
that, instead of determining the truth of state-attributions,
the empiricist should change the norm of this type of
theoretical discourse to quasi-truth. In this way, the com-
mitment to unobservables can be avoided, simply because
quasi-truth is weaker than truth. As we saw, in claiming
that a sentence α is quasi-true, we are not committed to
the claim that it captures, in full detail, all the structure
of the domain in question: the relations defined over the
domain D2 (which concern unobservable aspects of the
domain under study) are left open. The only components
that are fixed are those that refer to the observable aspects
of the domain (which are found, roughly speaking, in D1).
So, from the fact that a theory T (about particle physics)
is quasi-true, we cannot conclude that the unobservable
aspects of the domain under study are fully described.
Note that empirical adequacy has the same feature: if T
is empirically adequate, it does not follow that it is true,
i.e. that it describes, in full detail, all aspects of the world;
the only aspects that are properly accommodated are the
observable ones. But since quasi-truth is always relative
to a given partial structure (which incorporates both an
observable part, D1, and an unobservable one, D2), it
readily generalizes van Fraassen’s notion of empirical
adequacy: roughly speaking, a theory is empirically ade-
quate if it is quasi-true in a partial structure that describes
the empirical phenomena. In this sense, quasi-truth is
appropriate for an empiricist view (for details, see [24]).
Now, to say that a state-attributing proposition [m, E]
is quasi-true–in a partial structure A, which represents
partial information about the state of the system–is to say
that there is an A-normal structure B in which [m, E] is
true. Note that B provides one possible way of extending
the partial information about the state; there may well
be different ways of extending it. But this suggests that
the concept of quasi-truth already introduces a notion of
modality. In fact, this point can be explicitly made as
follows (see also [43]): (a) P is quasi-true (in a partial
structure A) iff for all A-normal structures, P is true. (b)
♦P is quasi-true (in a partial structure A) iff there is an
A-normal structure in which P is true. (The notion of rela-
tive possibility can be introduced without difficulty.) Now,
as defined, these modal operators are clearly about the
structures under consideration, namely those employed
to represent the states of a given physical system. In
order to use these operators, there is no need to go be-
yond the language used to describe such states. There
is no need for the introduction of possible worlds, since
the modal operators are explicitly formulated in terms of
quasi-truth. Moreover, only a primitive notion of logical
consistency is assumed in the background, as part of the
partial structures approach. But there are independent
reasons to favor this form of modalism, given the need for
such a primitive notion in order to make sense of logical
consequence and logical constants [33–36]. In the end,
all we have to do is explore the representation possibili-
ties of the relevant structures. In this sense, the proposal
advanced here accommodates straightforwardly the con-
structive empiricist’s point that modal talk is concerned
with the structures we use to represent the phenomena.
But the question of the adequacy of the modal operators
formulated via quasi-truth immediately arises. Can we
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obtain results about such operators analogous to those
established in van Fraassen’s interpretation? In particular,
can we establish that:
[m, E] is quasi-true iff 〈m, E〉 is quasi-true?
This is, of course, the crucial modal result (in terms of
quasi-truth) of the modal interpretation, highlighting a
consequence by which, in van Fraassen’s words, the inter-
pretation “merits at once the epithet ‘modal”’ [13, p.314].
The result is not difficult to establish. First, let us as-
sume that 〈m, E〉 is quasi-true. Thus, for all A-normal
structures B, 〈m, E〉 is true; in other words, in each B
the observable m actually has a value in E (in symbols:
λ(w)(m) ⊆ E, where λ(w), the value state, is taken as a
map from observables into non-empty Borel sets). Now,
since this holds for each B, there is an A-normal struc-
ture B′ in which the state is such that the probability that
the observable m has a value in E is one (in symbols:
Pmx (E) = 1). Hence, [m, E] is true in B
′, and therefore it
is quasi-true. Second, let us assume that 〈m, E〉 is not
quasi-true. In this case, there is no A-normal structure B
in which 〈m, E〉 is true; that is, in no B does the observ-
able m have a value in E. Thus, there is no B in which the
state is such that the probability that m has a value in E is
one. Therefore, [m, E] is not quasi-true. This concludes
the proof.
It is thus established that state-attributing propositions
are equivalent to the necessitation of value-attributions.
This is expected given the definition of state-attributions:
they determine a strong, modal claim about the state of
a physical system. The result helps us to see the explicit
role that is played by modal notions in the interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics since it provides a way of
representing the possibilities open to the evolution of a
physical system and the interrelationships between the
modal operators that are formulated.
It is worth noting that, by moving to the partial struc-
tures approach, we can also represent an important feature
of van Fraassen’s modal interpretation. As we saw, van
Fraassen’s rejection of von Neumann’s interpretation rule
allowed the introduction of unsharp values to observ-
ables. Now, such unsharp values may be assigned to an
observable m by a value state λ. As van Fraassen indi-
cates, one way of spelling this out “‘is to say that λ is
a partial function assigning values to some observables
but not to others” [13, p.307]. Although van Fraassen
does not adopt this alternative, it is clear that, within the
partial structures approach, this move can be represented
straightforwardly. If we view a value state as a partial
function (which is a particular kind of partial relation), the
unsharp values are those for which λ is not defined (given
our current knowledge about the state of the physical sys-
tem under consideration). It then becomes clear why we
need the necessitation of value-attributions to make them
equivalent to state attributions: intuitively speaking, all
possibilities have to be covered.
Thus, by moving to partial structures and quasi-truth,
the two problems faced by van Fraassen’s modal inter-
pretation can be overcome: we do not have to talk about
the truth of state-attributing propositions (and can remain
empiricist about them), and there is a straightforward
way of introducing modality into the modal interpreta-
tion (via the notion of quasi-truth), which satisfies strictly
empiricist constraints.
6 Conclusion
Although far more could be said, I hope to have indicated
that the present framework provides a plausible setting for
the empiricist to investigate the quantum domain. Given
the role played by structures and modal operators in the
approach, it seems adequate to call it a modal-structural
interpretation. If developed further, it provides an inter-
esting way of examining, in modal and empiricist terms,
some of the peculiarities of the foundations of quantum
mechanics.
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